This is a discussion for a possible proposal to increase the active collator set on either / both Moonriver and Moonbeam (the original post was a proposal in governance, but moved to General to determine if the community supports the idea, before posting a proposal).
Abstract - The current active collator set on Moonbeam has seen five new entrants (as of this posting), which due to the fixed limit of 72 collator slots has led to 5 collators going out of the active set. This proposal seeks to relieve the current pressure on the active set by increasing the on-chain limit by a community agreed amount (TBD).
Details - The active collator set currently allows for 72 reward generating collators (with rewards being generated for both the collator and the delegators that have staked to a collator that is in the top 72 based on total delegations).
Collators are stack ranked based on total delegations, and only the top 72 collators by total delegations are permitted by the chain to collate transactions and earn rewards. This top 72 calculation is made at the blockchain round change, which is around every two hours on Moonriver and around every six hours on Moonbeam.
Because significant collator rewards can be generated in the form of tokens by an active collator, obtaining and maintaining a spot in the top 72 collators in the active set can become very competitive.
Most of the currently active collators rely on delegations (stake) from the community to stay active, but anyone can also simply buy enough tokens to self-delegate and push their way into the active set without community delegations. This is one characteristic of a permissionless, open blockchain network. In fact, when this happens, it could be an indication of the interest in the network, and possibly a positive indicator of the health of the network.
However, because there is are only currently 72 active collators permitted, when there are new entrants into the collator set such as the five in the past three weeks, there is an impact to community delegators.
The most immediate impact is that delegators to the collators that fall out of the active set do not receive rewards while the collator is inactive. Only until the delegators realize that their collator has left the active set, and issue a revoke, will they start the process of moving their delegation to a new active collator (and once again start to receive rewards.
Specifically, when a delegator issues a revoke, there is a waiting period where the delegator does not earn rewards (approx. 2 days on Moonriver, and approx. 7 days on Moonbeam - which might be meaningless if the collator is out of the set, anyway). After the waiting period the delegator can then free their stake and delegate to a new collator. Frequently, we see a collator fall out of the active set during times of contention, stopping rewards for delegators, only to return a day or two later, only adding more confusion as to whether the delegator should revoke or not.
Most will agree that this is not a good experience for the delegator (caveat emptor be damned). Additionally, the aggregate of all rewards lost are not insignificant and are likely lost from those that rely on them the most (this point can be expanded on more, but typically a node that goes out has many lower GLMR delegations from smaller community members that can’t make the minimum bond of a more stable or well known collator to Moonbeam, such as a community collator).
While the problem identified is not a systemic risk to the network, due to the recent pressure on the active set of Moonebeam due to new entrants, a release valve exists in the form of increasing the total allowable collators in the active set. By increasing the total number of collators in the active set, it will prevent the current situation where delegator must remain uncertain and unconvinced that their collator will remain reward generating. It will just make room for the new entrants.
However, it will also decrease the overall collator rewards which should be a consideration not only to collators, but to delegators that value the importance of responsible, professional collating that is provided by current active set members, and the need for profit that is gained from this effort.
Although the current contention is in Moonbeam, it is proposed that an increase be enacted in Moonriver, following on to Moonbeam once the network can effectively enable and support an increase through governance.
A value of increase is purposefully not suggested so that the community can consider and decide a number, if it is deemed as the best course of action. In addition, it should be considered that Orbiter nodes are a way for smaller infrastructure providers to engage with the network, and any increase in the active set should consider if more Orbiter nodes should be included. It’s also suggested that with an increase in Orbiter nodes (if deemed appropriate), community participation requirements should be considered in discussion around an Orbiter increase.
No links are provided at this time.