StellaSwap Ecosystem Grant Proposal

StellaSwap: Ecosystem Grant Draft Proposal

  • Author - StellaSwapCD

TLDR

  • Primary Goal - Maintain and Grow Activity (active users, transactions, TVL)

  • Project Description - StellaSwap is a hybrid DEX that features a standard, stable and concentrated liquidity AMM to facilitate the most optimal price discovery for assets on Moonbeam. We’re currently the largest DEX on Polkadot, capturing over 60%-75% of total volume across the Polkadot ecosystem

  • Requested GLMR Grant Amount - 2M GLMR

  • Use of Grant - It will be used to continue sustaining the market depth of strategic assets for the ecosystem, as well as solidify Moonbeam’s position as the most popular trading hub on Polkadot via StellaSwap

  • Motivation for Grant Amount- Liquidity depth is a necessary requirement for a robust and efficient marketplace that powers the ecosystem. Not only does StellaSwap accounts for 80%-95% of trading activity on Moonbeam, we’ve become the most popular trading venue for all of Polkadot, accounting for 60%-75% of all trades on Polkadot! The continuation of grants would foster greater market depth via our newly-launched Pulsar + stable AMM and allow vital functions such as the liquidation of underwater loans to occur. We’ve also figured out a way to distribute ALM rewards in a fair and equitable manner.

PROJECT OVERVIEW & TEAM EXPERIENCE

StellaSwap is a hybrid DEX that features a standard, stable and concentrated liquidity AMM to facilitate the most optimal price discovery for assets on Moonbeam. As the largest DEX on Polkadot and an integrated DeFi gateway, users can tap on a comprehensive list of features that simplifies their DeFi experience. Users can engage in trading, liquidity provisioning, bridging, cross-chain swaps, and a whole host of things. Here’s our achievements since inception;

  • Only DEX on Polkadot with over $1.1B in trading volume

  • First DEX to go live on Moonbeam; has been the prominent DEX ever since. At its peak, StellaSwap accumulated over $140M in TVL and had an average daily volume of around $3-$5M. StellaSwap has pioneered several novel mechanisms such as our Initial Liquidity Offering (ILO) to foster capital inflows towards Moonbeam, ZAP feature to facilitate 1-click staking, and we’ve launched the first concentrated liquidity AMM called Pulsar, which is the most capital efficient AMM to date

  • We’ve worked with key protocols such as Moonwell, Lido, Beefy, Qidao, Wormhole and a long list of projects to develop a robust trading venue for the ecosystem.

  • Was one out of 4 protocols that received the subsequent Level 3 ecosystem grants (Tranche #1, March 2023), securing the highest allocation of of grants at 37% (~1.6M GLMR). Continued working with projects in DeFi to spearhead growth within Moonbeam, such as Squid+Axelar for cross chain swaps, cross chain utility with Prime Protocol, a long list of AMMs such as Mellow Protocol, DeFiEdge, Gamma to further simplify V3 staking.

  • We’re made up of a tight knit group of technologists and DeFi natives that previously founded one of the first regulated digital assets exchanges in the Middle East. Our founding team also includes a senior research associate from London School of Economics (LSE). Our team brings a wealth of expertise in digital assets trading and security systems, with prior experiences across high growth start-ups. We have been fully KYC-ed by the Moonbeam team.

PERFORMANCE & ANALYSIS

Before proceeding to deeper details of our proposal, it is only fair that we provide an overview of our performance in the previous grant cycle AKA Tranche #1:

Achievements

1. Proven Capital Efficiency for Ecosystem Liquidity via Launch of Pulsar

We launched Pulsar at the start of the year to significantly boost capital efficiency for the ecosystem with the most efficient AMM to date. The success of Pulsar is manifested in;

  • Average utilization rate of 30% and even peaking to above 100% in some instances (vs standard AMM’s 5%-10%)
  • Efficiency rates of 10X - 20X
  • Lowest slippage achieved on Moonbeam across all bluechip pairs since network inception, even with lower TVL
  • Sustainable yields via trade fee generation
  • Launch of Community farms category that feature organic farms
  • DEX with the most comprehensive list of assets across Polkadot

2. Strong General Metrics

StellaSwap was the first project that launched the grants immediately in the last cycle. Here’s the sequence of events leading up to the grants and post disbursement;

  • March 20: Transition from V2 to V3 started
  • April 3: Snapshot voting ended
  • April 7: Receipt of Ecosystem grants
  • April 10: Disbursement of eco grants on Pulsar farms according to public schedule

For context, we began transitioning our farms from our standard AMM (V2) to Pulsar (V3) well ahead of time on starting on March 20, to ensure the optimal transition of funds by users and to prepare for the ecosystem grants. After 3 days of setting up post grants receipt, we launched eco rewards on Pulsar, ensuring that LPs had immediate access to rewards. Any delays to grants going live would result in capital outflow from Moonbeam, which is detrimental to the ecosystem as the cost of capital acquisition is far higher as compared to the cost of capital transition (V2 > V3). On that front, we’re proud to go live with eco grants as soon as possible.

Trading Volume

Across Pulsar V3, standard AMM V2 and stable AMM, StellaSwap is averaging $1m-$3m daily volumes, which represent around 85% - 95% of all trades on Moonbeam. Not only that, we’ve managed to hold the #1 position of the top DEX in all of Polkadot, according to total daily volume. TLDR: The majority of Polkadot users are using StellaSwap to trade!

Daily Active Users
As the largest DEX on Moonbeam, we’ve amassed the largest daily users across all DEXs on Moonbeam.

This is further validated by us having the lion’s share of the total transactions on Moonbeam.

Slippage

We’re proud to have the lowest slippage since Moonbeam’s inception, thanks to concentrated liquidity. Even with lower TVLs due to lower grant amount, slippage is drastically better than our standard AMM V2 farms. Therefore, even with a significant reduction (of over 79%) of our previous grants amount, we’ve managed to ensure the lowest slippage across Polkadot. This strengthens our path towards sustainability and reduction of reliance towards more grants.

Asset Utilization

A relevant metric for the evaluation of a DEX’s efficiency is utilisation rate. This entails the ratio between daily trading volume relative to its TVL; a higher utilisation rate means greater velocity of liquidity to support trades. Having a concentrated liquidity AMM foster greater utilisation rate as the bulk of the liquidity is effective in supporting trade. On average, a standard AMM V2 possess a utilisation rate of 5%-10%. There have been several cases where a farm achieved more than 100% utilization rate!

TVL Performance

Our current TVL stands at around $8.5M, peaking at around $12M in the last few months. To be clear, the drop in TVL for our V2 was completely expected due to the transition to Pulsar V3, as well as a significant reduction on our grant amount in USD in the last cycle. For comparison, we received 79% less grants in USD value in the last cycle compared to the last quarter of 2023, due to a drop in GLMR price and the fact that we received 1.6M GLMR out of the max cap cap of 2M GLMR that was asked.

3. Simplifying User Journey via Key Launches

We launched several features that aimed to simplify users’ DeFi journey to maximize our grants. These include;

  • Migrator tool to provide convenience for transition to Pulsar V3 farms
  • Pulsar 1-Pager enhancement for better intuitiveness and streamline staking
  • 1-Click withdrawal that batches multiple txns into one and save gas by up to 80%
  • Significantly reduced Pulsar’s latency to less than a second for values display to maximise loading speed times
  • Crosschain swaps on StellaSwap is now the most popular way to send value to Moonbeam, beating out direct bridging

4.Igniting Moonbeam as the Hub

  • Launched several key farms that is native to Moonbeam as well as assets from other parachains that included: ZOO, D20, iBTC, INTR, PHA and CFG
  • Moonbeam is the top 3 receiving destination for cross chain swaps, thanks to the increasing popularity of cross chain swaps on StellaSwap powered by our close partners Squid + Axelar
  • Partnered with Prime Protocol to foster more DeFi usage and composability within Moonbeam
  • Partnered with active liquidity managers such as Mellow, DeFiEgde and Gamma to simplify V3 staking
  • Integrated with De.Fi, a prominent DeFi portfolio tracker that allow thousands of users to track Moonbeam and StellaSwap holdings
  • Integrated with Defispot, one of the largest open aggregator in DeFi, allowing users to be routed to Moonbeam/StellaSwap’s liquidity

RATIONALE

The Moonbeam ecosystem will stand to gain in the following ways;

1. Foster Market Depth

With the next round of ecosystem grants, StellaSwap can maintain ecosystem liquidity depth to foster greater network activity on Moonbeam. Greater market depth facilitates efficient price discovery, which is required for protocols such as Moonwell, Prime protocol, DAM - and a host of DeFi applications - to operate. With incentives, there will be an inflow of new users that will be exposed to the various use cases within the ecosystem, including connected contract capabilities. Developers are more inclined towards building their dApps on a network with critical mass.

2. Efficient Price Discovery

With greater effectiveness of ecosystem liquidity (TVL) on Moonbeam, price discovery for token value would be the most optimal and slippage would be mitigated, thereby resulting in a conducive trading environment for users. Ultimately, end users will reap the rewards from a liquid market on Moonbeam from ecosystem incentives, resulting in lower slippages and a more streamlined user experience.

3. Fostering Flywheel Effects

With an efficient market for price discovery on Moonbeam, it is much easier to foster flywheel effects to the rest of the ecosystem. Asset composability and utility can be maximised, resulting in a more robust DeFi scene on Moonbeam. For instance, StellaSwap’s initial liquidity of native Polkadot assets such as Interlay’s iBTC, Bifrost’s upcoming LSDs (vDOT/vGLMR) would kickstart utility across protocols such as Moonwell & Prime protocol.

WHAT IS PULSAR?

We’re extremely proud to announce the next evolution of StellaSwap: concentrated liquidity. We’ve partnered with Algebra to launch a capital-efficient DEX called Pulsar, which represents a ground-breaking enhancement to StellaSwap’s current hybrid DEX, utilizing the power of concentrated liquidity to provide a much more efficient way of trading and earning as before. With Pulsar, users will access optimal asset prices, low-slippage and greater yield optimization for LP stakers!

Here’s a quick summary of how concentrated liquidity is a beast of AMMs;

  • LPs can provide liquidity with up to 4,000x capital efficiency relative to standard AMMs, earning higher ROIs on their capital

  • Liquidity utilization rates beyond 100%, compared to an average of 5%-10% that StellaSwap currently has. This is good news for LPs as they’ll earn more fees for a given capital base

  • Capital efficiency results in ultra-low slippage trade execution that can surpass both centralized exchanges and stable AMMs

  • LPs can significantly increase their exposure to preferred assets and reduce their downside risk

  • LPs can sell one asset for another by adding liquidity to a price range entirely above or below the market price, approximating a fee-earning limit order that executes along a smooth curve️

  • With greater ROI potential, STELLA emissions can be exponentially reduced. With a reduced inflation rate, we’ll be on the path of tokenholder-value maximization.

FAIR & EQUITABLE APPROACH FOR ACTIVE LIQUIDITY MANAGERS (ALMs)

As per previous grants, we’ve underlined the importance of working with ALMs to simplify V3 staking, just as Beefy simplified auto-reinvestments of V2 farms. That has been our main priority and we’ve been working closely with several ALMs which include;

  • Mellow Protocol
  • Beefy
  • Gamma
  • DefiEdge
  • Unipilot

After liaising with these ALMs, we uncovered a core component that needed to be addressed to ensure fairness and equitability: ALM reward distribution. Under current status quo, token incentives are deployed under the ALM. This means for DEXs that that manage their own V3 token incentives like StellaSwap requires another separate “account” on ALMs to disburse rewards for users that are staked via the ALM. This is fundamentally different than the previous status quo on V2, where a V2 ALM equivalent - in the form of Beefy - doesn’t require incentives since the constant reinvestment process under that scenario resulted in cumulatively better yields, in the form of APYs.

Yeah, this is big brain time.

Because of the need to have a different set of incentives on an ALM for the same farm, it brings about several key questions that needs to be addressed;

  • How will token incentives be split across direct LP stakes on V3 (e.g. LP on StellaSwap) vs LP staking via ALMs)? What’s considered an equitable balance between both options especially in the context of eco grants?

  • Since it is a zero-sum game (unlike the V2 model where we only need to directly incentivise our farms and Beefy compounds into APYs), how do we deal with the cannabilization between the two sets of users? Emphasising on one set of users compromises on the other.

  • How do we deal with ecosystem grants in such a scenario? For instance, assume we have a 2M GLMR grant and work with one ALM. Will the distribution between direct LP stakes vs LPs via ALM follow our native token distribution? That would halve the impact of ecosystem grants, assuming we’re only incentivising one farm for 1M GLMR and the same farm needs to be incentivised on that one ALM for another 1M GLMR.

  • What about other ALMs? We’re already working with other ALMs, and any incremental ALM in the ecosystem would further depreciate the impact of eco grants. An example is incentivising just 1 farm with 2M GLMR; 666,666 to direct LP stakes on STELLA, 666,666 to ALM 1 & 666,666 to ALM 2? This therefore puts us at conundrum; select 1 exclusive ALM to minimise degradation impact but creating a monopoly or work with several ALMs but maximise inefficacy. In either case, the cons seem to overpower the pros.

The long list of pertinent questions was something that we had to carefully dissect in order to minimise risk and ensure an equitable outcome for all stakeholders. Sticking to the status quo - which means surrendering our control over token rewards to the ALM - would result in the following weaknesses;

  • Complexity in achieving an optimal balance between direct stakes vs via an ALM

  • Cannibalise eco grants usage to a point of inefficient and degraded impact of the said grants, since a single farm (e.g. GLMR-DOT) would require eco grants to be divided between the DEX and across the various ALMs that support that said farm (e.g. Dividing 2M GLMR across the same pool: GLMR-DOT on StellaSwap, GLMR-DOT [Narrow] on ALM 1, GLMR-DOT [Wide] on ALM 1, GLMR-DOT [Narrow] on ALM 2, GLMR-DOT [Wide] on ALM 2)

  • Foster a monopoly of an ALM that prevents a fair/equitable level ground for the rest of ALMs interested in deploying to Moonbeam, thereby forcing users to choose 1 ALM

  • Requires conceiving a separate economic model just for a singular ALM distribution

  • Discriminates against users that want to directly LP and are actively managing their positions

SOLUTION: OFF-CHAIN REWARDER BECAUSE WE WANT FAIRNESS FOR ALL

An off-chain rewarder approach is the best approach to ensure we evade the weaknesses listed above. The plan is to - as best as possible - emulate the V2 staking process where third party managers like Beefy maximise value for users without the need for their own economic model in managing yields. An off-chain rewarder provides for the following;

* One single pool that distributes all the assigned rewards efficiently to both direct stakes in StellaSwap and any other LPs on any ALMs
* All ALMs can receive rewards on their vaults on an equitable basis
* No need to stake tokens anywhere, as long as you’ve provided liquidity you will get reward
* Reduces smart contract risks i.e all LP tokens are locked in one smart contract
* Unlocks a lot of custom reward mechanisms, for example the ability to reward concentrated positions more than non-concentrated ones in a specific ratio, or the ability to award OOR liquidity

Our off-chain rewarder references the ground-breaking work done by Angle Protocol and it is ready to be deployed when the next round of incentives begin.

VISION OF SUCCESS

Our vision is to be the Schelling point for trading on Polkadot. With Polkadot’s Cross-Consensus Message Format (XCM) to unite inter-Polkadot liquidity and the rise of cross-chain connected contract applications to unlock inter-network synergies, our main goal is to harness total interoperability for Moonbeam network.

In order to further work towards our vision, the core of our foundation as a DEX is predicated on providing a robust trading infrastructure that fosters a conducive environment to enable the most optimum price discovery. Once this is established, we can observe the actualization of flyover effects as protocols tap on StellaSwap’s liquidity depth for their corresponding use cases.

As we’ve demonstrated not only the establishment of baseline market depth, the next chapter entails unlocking capital efficiency to ensure ecosystem grants go much further in deepening ecosystem liquidity. The transition of both protocol & ecosystem emissions towards Pulsar will further reduce the cost of trading and would set the stage for sustainable yield generation emanating from organic trade fees. This has been validated via the launch of Pulsar, which has seen tremendous capital efficiency gains in the last month.

RELEVANT KPIs

As part of the continual accountability of the grants process, the type of metrics that are relevant for StellaSwap include;

1) Cost of Trading

The ultimate goal for the usage of ecosystem rewards is to create a conducive market environment that fosters efficient pricing is the cost of trading. This is generally divided into two main components;

  • Trading Fees: One of the core features of Pulsar is its dynamic (variable) fee component, that adjusts itself based on a myriad of factors that include asset volatility, liquidity and trading volume. Based on analytics, Pulsar’s trading fees have been consistently lower than the fixed 0.30% used by other AMMs.

  • Price Impact: The most important metric related to the cost of trading is price impact, which is similar to the notion of slippage on an AMM. Essentially, a more efficient AMM like Pulsar would enable much lower price impact for trades. Pulsar’s efficiency enables ecosystem grants to be more productive in creating a deeper market, which translates into lower price impact. Ensuring price impact is low for trades facilitates greater trading efficacy, which creates a positive loop for liquidity deployment.

Moving towards measuring the effectiveness of liquidity relative to its quantity (TVL) would allow us to measure how far a certain amount of grants has succeeded in creating a conducive trading environment. In order to illustrate this point, we can analyze the current variance of TVL & price impact of pools from different AMMs;

Pool 1: USDC - GLMR

  • AMM: Standard AMM
  • TVL: $2M
  • Price Impact of $5k trade: 0.52%

Pool 2: USDT- DOT

2) Trading Volume

Greater volume indicates greater user activity on the chain, and is perhaps one of the most important metrics to optimize for a DEX. We were successful in attracting volume to the ecosystem as StellaSwap became the first DEX in all of Polkadot to surpass $1.1B in cumulative trading volume.

3) Total Value Locked (TVL)

It is inevitable that TVL is regarded as one of the strongest indicators of popularity and health of any ecosystem. The higher the TVL, the stronger the ecosystem as it is more trusted and reliable. TVL will continue to be an important - but not defining - metric of evaluation. This is because the efficiency that has been proven by Pulsar V3 has reduced the reliance to acquire more TVL, as the main objective for liquidity is to facilitate low slippage. Pulsar V3 has shown that the same degree of slippage can be achieved with much lower TVL.

4) Unique Users

User acquisition is a core metric for growth of any protocol; a growing protocol is attributed - in part - to an increase in the number of users. It is imperative to track and optimize for user acquisition, especially when ecosystem incentives are used. The objective is to attract and onboard as many users as we can onto the Moonbeam network.

USE OF GRANTS TIMELINE

It must be emphasized that the totality of the 2M grants will be used to incentivize farms on both Pulsar & stable AMM to maintain liquidity. Under no circumstances would any of the grants be used for development or any other purposes beyond incentivizing the farms, which goes to LP stakers.

This current round of grants will run for approximately 6 months, and will be used to continue incentivizing strategic farms. Strategic farms are made up of assets of strategic importance, which are in the form of blue-chips. It is imperative that current baseline liquidity is maintained so as to ensure the full-functioning of the ecosystem without any capital leakage. Here is the breakdown of the farms and their corresponding rewards that will be incentivised in this grant cycle;

The strategic farms represent a similar list to the previous grant list. Our aim is to stretch the ecosystem rewards for up to 6 months. We believe that the grants for this cycle will go a long way in maintaining the current level of market depth and to prevent capital leakage.

Contingency Plan

As GLMR (incentive) represents a finite resource that must be effectively deployed, StellaSwap must be ready to deploy a contingency plan in the event of a black swan. The main concerns around pausing or stopping emissions due to adverse market conditions is as follows;

  1. If LP’s know there’s a possibility of disruption in rewards they won’t bring it to being with and the campaign won’t be successful
  2. We have seen that it is more expensive to attract liquidity back thus offsetting any “savings” in pausing

With that in mind, we believe that any stoppage to the emissions should only occur in a scenario similar of that to what we experienced;

  • In the event of a black swan where a security incident that resulted in the de-pegging of an asset, StellaSwap will cease emissions into the farm until there is clarity on next steps, whether it be post-resolution or deprecation.

Additionally, it should also be mentioned that our targets and objectives will be pro-rated in accordance to the amount of grants we get. For example, if we get 50% of the $2M cap, then our target metrics will be halved in accordance to the discount in value that we receive in grants.

KPI MILESTONES

This section tracks the relevant metrics that will give rise to the success or failure of our grants. As seasoned applicants of the grants program, we’re dedicated to tracking the most pertinent metrics that evaluate the efficacy of grants usage. A main metric that we look at is Grant/TVL Ratio. For context;

Grant to TVL Ratio (Mar 2023)= 56X

Previous Grant: 1,677,150 GLMR
Value at time of receival: $637,317
Value today: $452,662
Max TVL Achieved: $12M
Grant to TVL Ratio = 56X

Grant to TVL Ratio (Oct 2022)= 54X

Former Grant : 7,833,600 GLMR
Value at time of receival: $3,086,928
Value today: $2,114,287
Max TVL Achieved: $28M

Our target for this grant cycle is to achieve an efficiency factor of 52X or less. What this metric effectively means is that for every $1 of ecosystem grants that we receive we’ll get more TVL.

The Projected TVL that we calculated was based on a conservative schedule, and with an efficiency factor of 52X or less we’re aiming towards a TVL of close to $10M. The other core metric that will be tracked is Daily Volume.

Our goal is to foster greater trading volume from greater liquidity efficiencies, product launches and partnerships with projects/ecosystems. From a current average of $1M daily, we aim to raise the average daily volume by 50%-100%.

In addition, here’s the following targets for user growths, which is manifested as unique addresses;

  • 15% growth for Unique Addresses interacting with StellaSwap in the next 6 months

STEPS TO IMPLEMENT

Similar to the previous grants, our infrastructure is ready to receive the grants at any point of time and go live. We strongly believe that grant recipients should distribute ecosystem grants immediately and in unison to maximise the impact for the ecosystem, and that is what we will continue to do. Here’s the breakdown of steps for disbursement upon successful grants acquisition;

  • Receive ecosystem grants to our public multi-signature address
  • Transfer ecosystem rewards to rewarder contract for distribution to LP stakes
  • Launch off-chain rewarder to facilitate equitable reward distribution across direct LP stakers & ALM shakers

We will ensure that there is no lapse of ecosystem rewards between the previous and current cycle to ensure no liquidity leaks from the ecosystem. In the event that we receive lower than our initial ask of 2M GLMR, then our target metrics will be adjusted on a pro-rated basis, especially with regards to TVL. The adjustment will be mainly based on the USD value of the grant at the point of disbursement.

SECURITY

Security is a core aspect of StellaSwap that deserves a section on so that the community can appreciate the processes that we’ve established. Here is a list of security mechanisms on StellaSwap;

  • All our AMMs have gone through full audits via Certik & Solidproof
  • Pulsar has been audited by ABDK consulting & Hexen. We partnered with Quickswap to do an additional layer of audit on Code4rena before deployment
  • We have one of the highest bounty in the ecosystem on ImmuneFi across Critical & High
  • Users can also insure their positions on LP of up to $1.5MM in capacity on InsureAce, covering SC vulnerability.
3 Likes

Stella have demonstrated a track record in constantly delivering and being a key liquidity hub and gateway for the Moonbeam - Polkadot ecosystem. Given market conditions and the overall sentiment, a focus on more synergies between Polkadot native assets and building unique EVM use-cases is of importance for the ecosystem especially in showcasing XCM. As a result, if the Stella grant request passes, i think Stella must consider strategically allocating a % of their incentives to other strategic assets which are prominent native Polkadot assets or at least assets which are demonstrating strong growth and plan to drive usage on Moonbeam, such as the ones mentioned in the proposal (Interlay iBTC and vDOT, vGLMR as examples). Finally, relating to point 3 of “fostering flywheel effects” - this is key for any ecosystem however I do think its of importance for Stella to consider their stance on this front, as currently projects who wish to list their assets on Pulsar main page and incentivise their pools have to pay a listing fee and their is a minimum incentive threshold which is a barrier of entry for some teams from an economics point of view and who value permissionless solutions…Although yes the recent addition of community pools is permissionless in nature, they do come with various drawbacks - no incentives , no co-marketing support opportunity from Stella to drive users and so forth… thus bringing not much value for the project who wishes to tap into Moonbeams liquidity, user base via Stellas community pools. Overall, I think for this grant proposal to benefit the wider ecosystem and not just Stella in cementing their dominance the points addressed have to be considered and tackled.

3 Likes

hey StellaSwapCD, Thank You for your proposal!

I would like to ask you a few questions:

  1. Have you considered the possibility of extending the liquidity incentives for a longer duration, such as 9 or 12 months? How do you believe this longer incentive period might impact Stellaswap’s ability to achieve its goals?

  2. I noticed that you are working on the liquid staking GLMR feature. could you please provide some information about the planned launch date and the security measures that will be implemented to ensure safety against potential exploits? additionally, if the launch of stGLMR is successful and goes exceptionally well, do you have any plans to offer a similar opportunity for DOT, for example? i would be interested to hear your thoughts on this

Hey ser, thank you for your kind words and feedback!

i think Stella must consider strategically allocating a % of their incentives to other strategic assets which are prominent native Polkadot assets or at least assets which are demonstrating strong growth and plan to drive usage on Moonbeam, such as the ones mentioned in the proposal (Interlay iBTC and vDOT, vGLMR as examples)

We 100% agree with you. That’s what we’ve been doing since the start. In fact, we’re the only app on Moonbeam that has spearheaded growth of native Polka assets on Moonbeam;

  • Submitted proposal & successfully secured INTR incentives on Interlay’s governance for the launch of iBTC
  • Submitted proposal & successfully secured CFG incentives on Interlay’s governance for the launch of CFG
  • Directly secured farm launch of ASTR from Astar team
  • Directly secured farm launch of PHALA from Phala network team
  • In the midst of finalizing farm details with Bifrost for their LSDs and native token

Now the main thing is how do we foster greater adoption/utility for these native assets? The easy way is to flush it with GLMR incentives, but we don’t think this is the appropriate solution. Why? Because GLMR rewards should be for strategic assets for Moonbeam ecosystem, which entails bluechip assets that facilitate capital inflow. Fostering adoption for Polkadot native assets should be first the priority of the corresponding parachains and Polkadot ecosystem (Parity) before that of Moonbeam. Therefore, an appropriate measure in the context of a parachain asset should be as such;

  • Farm incentives by the parachain (e.g. ASTR incentives by Astar Network)
  • Farm incentives/POL via Polkadot treasury grant

The above 2 approaches would be more appropriate to be undertaken, as opposed to incentives by Moonbeam, which in this case isnt strategic to MB but more on the Polkadot ecosystem front. In this regard, we’re working with the relevant stakeholders to make it happen.

as currently projects who wish to list their assets on Pulsar main page and incentivise their pools have to pay a listing fee and their is a minimum incentive threshold which is a barrier of entry for some teams from an economics point of view and who value permissionless solutions…Although yes the recent addition of community pools is permissionless in nature, they do come with various drawbacks - no incentives , no co-marketing support opportunity from Stella to drive users and so forth… thus bringing not much value for the project who wishes to tap into Moonbeams liquidity, user base via Stellas community pools.

Firstly, important to understand that we will help any project as much as we can to spur adoption for their assets. We’ve initiated discussions with every project in the space to support their growth. In terms of listing, there are various vectors that requires a sustainable path;

  • Structured marketing plan & strategies
  • STELLA emissions to spur TVL, which is at a cost for StellaSwap as we’re incentivizing the farm
  • Integration works to execute farms

The second point is perhaps the most critical; although we’ve launched V3 that creates a sustainable path for projects in that we can wean away from incentives and lean on sustainable trade fee APR for TVL accrual, there still needs to be some form of incentives for TVL to accrue, and if the project doesn’t want to incentivise their own farm or provide a fee to cover the cost of emissions, the bill to incentivize that farm squarely rests on Stella, which is not sustainable. This is akin to us fully subsidizing the farm at our own expenses, to the detriment to our own tokenholders. There must be a shared effort and cost outlay from the listed project too in order to spearhead growth.

Alternatively, community farms is the perfect way for projects that do not want to incentivise their farms to set up their farms decentrally.

1 Like

Hi Turrizt, thanks for your qns!

  1. Have you considered the possibility of extending the liquidity incentives for a longer duration, such as 9 or 12 months? How do you believe this longer incentive period might impact Stellaswap’s ability to achieve its goals?

We believe the period matches the amount of incentives to achieve StellaSwap’s goals. However, we constantly run analytics to ensure elasticity of rewards. Therefore, in certain market conditions the rewards can be extended beyond the set period.

With the goal of accruing sufficient liquidity to provide the lowest slippage for traders while offering attractive returns for LPs, the price of GLMR plays a big part. In addition to the level of trade activity, when those two factors are positive extending the reward period can be done

I noticed that you are working on the liquid staking GLMR feature. could you please provide some information about the planned launch date and the security measures that will be implemented to ensure safety against potential exploits? additionally, if the launch of stGLMR is successful and goes exceptionally well, do you have any plans to offer a similar opportunity for DOT, for example? i would be interested to hear your thoughts on this

This is something we’ve been working on for the last 9 months, and we’re extremely excited about the launch. The reason it has taken so long was the fact that we had to natively built each piece of the infrastructure to ensure simplicity in the user journey as well as conforming to flexibility based on the parameters we’ve set. This includes building out the ledger & oracle infra and the yield management system.

We’re prepping for beta launch within the next 2-3 weeks and public launch thereafter. In terms of security, we’ve ensured that every level of development entails an internal security analysis. Before launching to beta, we’ll send it to an external audit for additional coverage.

For DOT, that is something we’re considering and depending on interactions with several stakeholders, we will revert with some degree of certainty.

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understood and thanks for your feedback. In regards to Polkadot native assets i definitely think that assets which demonstrate a growth trajectory within the native Moonbeam ecosystem with usecases across Moonbeam native protocols would benefit from incentives as it would benefit both users coming to Moonbeam from lets say Polkadot Substrate and allow existing users familiar with Moonbeam to discover those assets too. However, certainly do think a DOT incentive or POL grant would also help drive these synergies .

Regarding your latter point I feel that the point is still unanswered- I believe projects are looking at seeding liquidity pools and incentivising them however have a desire to do so in permissionless manner whereby the project holds custody of their assets and in the future can retrieve it depending on the lifecycle and results of the pool. It would be appreciated if the Stellaswap team can address the noise around “listing fees”.

Hey Stella team and Moonbeam community!

Having gone through Stella’s proposal, I’m impressed to see the level of thought that has gone into addressing the challenges surrounding Active Liquidity Managers (ALMs) and CL/v3 staking, specifically in regard to incentives.

As our growing ecosystem now features two DEXs (Stellaswap and Beamswap) and three competitive ALMs (Charm, Gamma, and DefiEdge) all vying for grants to incentivize CL/v3 farming, it’s really important that the Moonbeam community first understands the situation at hand and second can make an educated decision on the best path forward. My goal here isn’t to sway anyone one way or another but to hopefully bring attention to this matter and spark what I believe is a needed conversation.

The advent of Concentrated Liquidity AMMs, introduced to Moonbeam by Stellaswap and Beamswap, has been an exciting development for the ecosystem, as these solutions offer tremendous benefits such as enhanced capital efficiency, reduced slippage, and improved liquidity utilization. However, with these benefits comes a more hands-on role for LPs to actively manage their positions, a departure from the V2 model’s “set it and forget it” approach. Enter ALMs, or Automated Liquidity Managers, which facilitate a more V2-esque experience, enabling LPs to ‘set and forget’ as the manager ensures their positions stay in range and profitable and avoid impermanent loss.

The challenge Stella highlights regarding incentives is crucial. Previously for v2 farms, grants went to the DEXs and they directly incentivized the farms. Third-party apps like Beefy could tap into these incentives without needing their own. Now, in the v3/Concentrated Liquidity era, ALMs require separate incentives, leading to a scenario where multiple ALMs and DEXs are all competing for grants to incentivize concentrated liquidity farming. The Stella team has pointed out that this makes it tricky to divvy out grants fairly/strategically between DEXs and ALMs and balance rewards for those staking natively on the DEXs and those using ALM solutions.

While I myself don’t have a silver-bullet solution, Stella’s suggestion of an off-chain rewarder is certainly an interesting one. Emulating the V2 staking process could potentially solve the incentive problem highlighted above, without the need for additional grants to ALMs. However, we should discuss this further as a community, focusing on aspects like transparency, equitability, and safety.

Yes, this topic is dense, but its importance can’t be overstated. The @beamswapio and @Az_StellaSwapCD teams, being at the forefront of concentrated liquidity challenges and our ecosystem’s CL “subject matter experts”, carry valuable insights that can enlighten the Moonbeam community. I’d love to hear more from them, as well as from representatives from Charm (@cryptoma20), DefiEdge (@DangerExploit), and Gamma (@bp_Gamma). I also encourage all interested community members to dive into this discussion, ask questions, and contribute towards crafting the most effective solution for our ecosystem. Let’s roll up our sleeves and get this dialogue started!

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I believe projects are looking at seeding liquidity pools and incentivising them however have a desire to do so in permissionless manner whereby the project holds custody of their assets and in the future can retrieve it depending on the lifecycle and results of the pool. It would be appreciated if the Stellaswap team can address the noise around “listing fees”.

Projects are free to create a pool on StellaSwap and can seed their own liquidity, which they have total autonomy over. The ‘fees’ is explained here:

In terms of listing, there are various vectors that requires a sustainable path
A) Structured marketing plan & strategies
B) STELLA emissions to spur TVL, which is at a cost for StellaSwap as we’re incentivizing the farm
C) Integration works to execute farms
The second point is perhaps the most critical; although we’ve launched V3 that creates a sustainable path for projects in that we can wean away from incentives and lean on sustainable trade fee APR for TVL accrual, there still needs to be some form of incentives for TVL to accrue, and if the project doesn’t want to incentivise their own farm or provide a fee to cover the cost of emissions, the bill to incentivize that farm squarely rests on Stella, which is not sustainable. This is akin to us fully subsidizing the farm at our own expenses, to the detriment to our own tokenholders. There must be a shared effort and cost outlay from the listed project too in order to spearhead growth. Alternatively, community farms is the perfect way for projects that do not want to incentivise their farms to set up their farms decentrally.

Beyond this, the ‘fees’ also serve as long-term liquidity that ensures that projects do not withdraw liquidity whenever they want to; basically ensuring base liquidity for the long-term. This ensures that users do not face slippage when trading the pair. So it fees in this sense is quite a misnomer. We do not want to pass the burden of thin liquidity to users.

Hey ser, this is exactly what we’ve been waiting for! In fact, we’ve pointed out that the issue of ALM reward distribution is perhaps the most important thing on our proposal, due to the impact it has on Moonbeam ecosystem. So let me address your concern head on!

The challenge Stella highlights regarding incentives is crucial. Previously for v2 farms, grants went to the DEXs and they directly incentivized the farms. Third-party apps like Beefy could tap into these incentives without needing their own. Now, in the v3/Concentrated Liquidity era, ALMs require separate incentives , leading to a scenario where multiple ALMs and DEXs are all competing for grants to incentivize concentrated liquidity farming. The Stella team has pointed out that this makes it tricky to divvy out grants fairly/strategically between DEXs and ALMs and balance rewards for those staking natively on the DEXs and those using ALM solutions.

Exactly, we’ve extensively elucidated this issue by asking several pertinent questions that led us to highlighting several weaknesses of this model, where ALMs control the incentives over the respective DEX. Please do read the section on our proposal aptly named" FAIR & EQUITABLE APPROACH FOR ACTIVE LIQUIDITY MANAGERS (ALMs).

Beyond that, it is important to bifurcate the scope for clarity; We’re NOT saying that ALMs are IRRELEVANT, and that respective DEXs like upcoming Uniswap V3 or Beamswap (direct fork of Uniswap) - that do not have farming contracts on their V3 - to have their own farming contracts to internalize incentive management. What we’re simply saying is that the respective DEXs SHOULD take custody of their rewards - both their native tokens and ecosystem GLMR - and distribute it to their respective ALMs of choice for DISTRIBUTION.

TLDR: DEXs should CUSTODY & MANAGE rewards and DISTRIBUTE to ALMs, if they do not have farming contracts.

Failure to do so opens up the various vectors of risks we highlighted;

  • Complexity in achieving an optimal balance between direct stakes vs via an ALM
  • Cannibalise eco grants usage to a point of inefficient and degraded impact of the said grants, since a single farm (e.g. GLMR-DOT) would require eco grants to be divided between the DEX and across the various ALMs that support that said farm (e.g. Dividing 2M GLMR across the same pool: GLMR-DOT on StellaSwap, GLMR-DOT [Narrow] on ALM 1, GLMR-DOT [Wide] on ALM 1, GLMR-DOT [Narrow] on ALM 2, GLMR-DOT [Wide] on ALM 2)
  • Foster a monopoly of an ALM that prevents a fair/equitable level ground for the rest of ALMs interested in deploying to Moonbeam, thereby forcing users to choose 1 ALM
  • Requires conceiving a separate economic model just for a singular ALM distribution
  • Discriminates against users that want to directly LP and are actively managing their positions

A point which wasn’t mentioned in the proposal was the potential conflict of interest thatALMs may be exposed to. For example, if a certain ALM has strong ties with StellaSwap and (hypothetically) if they’re the sole custody of ecosystem GLMR rewards, then they can very well pump out emissions mostly on Stella farms instead of other DEXs. This would be a conflict and creates an unfair system.

As much as StellaSwap loves every ALM, has talked to almost every ALM and has rolled the red carpet for their integration into Moonbeam, we’re fully cognizant of the risks of reward custody directly by each ALM, instead of them being the point of distribution. DEXs should undertake the role of custody and management because that expertise falls under our purview; optimizing rewards for each farm on a real-time basis based on various factors.

That is why we STRONGLY recommend that the ALMs be delegated to undertake the role of DISTRIBUTION, NOT CUSTODY & MANAGEMENT of ecosystem rewards. It would be much more optimal for each DEX to manage their own rewards, and use the respective ALMs to DISTRIBUTE rewards, in the case if they do not have farming contracts. For StellaSwap, we’ve integrated our own farming contracts so our optimal solution would be to utilize our own offchain rewarder, which automatically distributes rewards to any user that stakes, be it directly on us or via an ALM that supports our vault. We feel that it is the fairest way for reward distribution without incurring the heavy risks that we’ve explicated.

We strongly welcome feedback/criticism on our stand.

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Hey Stella team. First, thank you for your proposal. It’s really exciting to see all the new features, projects and partnerships coming to Stella. This proposal really highlights all the good work your team has done and continues to do on our ecosystem.

I would like to add the following questions and comments:

  1. Please describe in details the rewards distribution to each pool. Although it might suffer some slight changes in the future, it’s important to understand which pools will be receiving incentives and how much its expected each to receive

  2. “the drop in TVL for our V2 was completely expected due to […] and significant reduction on our grant amount in USD in the last cycle”. Regarding this point, it seems that Stella’s TVL is highly dependent on external incentives. With a lot of new features coming to Stella, will the project reach self-sustainable levels in a way that it won’t require grants to grow?

  3. You mentioned the Off-Chain Rewarder for AML’s in the “FAIR & EQUITABLE APPROACH FOR ACTIVE LIQUIDITY MANAGERS (ALMs).”. I read the whole section and it’s really exciting to see teams in our ecosystem working on real problems with no good solutions – I’m really excited to see the outcome of this. However, off-chain architecture brings some challenges and potential points of failure, etc. Could you expand on the security aspect of this solution? What measurements were taken to mitigate any risks? Also, are the ALMs aligned with the feature and will they trust and use it? Please share the feedbacks you’ve received from other teams.

  4. What will be the safety mechanisms and backup plan in case of a black swan event (technically and macroeconomically). What will be the plans for the grants distribution when that happens?

  5. Please only consider metrics that are directly related to the grant goals. Lower slippage , for example, seems to be a feature and not a goal. It’s a great feature, but this grant is not being used for lowering slippage or the reducing the cost of trading — these features were achieved by product development by your team in earlier stages and will help to achieve the actual goals (maybe TVL, UAW, transactions, etc).

  6. Please provide milestones and KPI breakdown for the 6-month incentives. What do you expect in terms of User Growth, Tx Growth and TVL Growth. Although market conditions might interfere significantly in this plan, it is the outmost importance that Stella provides the community with tangible, quantifiable metrics of success.

  7. According to Web3Go analytics, I compared the performance of the grantees of the Tranche 1 Program. It seems Beamswap is achieving similar results or growth with 1/3 of the grant Stellaswap’s team has received. Please comment on the case, provide your thoughts on the efficiency of the previous grant, and your strategy and tactics for efficiently use of the grant to bring more growth to Stellaswap and Moonbeam.

Please note that you have until July 14th, 11:59 PM UTC to make changes to your proposal. A list of changes based on community feedback should be added to the “Updates’’ section of the proposal and any changes should be reflected in the text of the proposal itself

2 Likes

I would really like to know at what point Stellaswap will consider that it does not need more incentives (grants) to be able to be functional and sustainable

Stellaswap has received various grants since the beginning.

so the tvl is currently only incentive farmers?

3 Likes

Hello,

a great writeup by StellaSwap team, grants are like newsletters. Pulsar developed by Algrebra is really nice. Congratulations on the partnership and all achievements to date.

I hope that this time before voting we get some clarity and accountability over actual StellaSwap numbers:

In the first grant you have missed the TVL milestones created by Quoting you: “leading defi experts” by 50%. You have blamed the market for the failure.
In the second grant you have missed the milestones by over 80%. What happened?

This time you haven’t provided any numbers at all?

  1. There are many projects that stated need for “pay for listing at StellaSwap” or partners which needed to sign “StellaSwap only” agreements? How do you comment?

  2. In total Moonbeam Ecosystem has given you over $10M in GLMR rewards and the results based on Web3go and DefiLlama don’t show any justification for this. How do you comment? When does the StellaSwap team become self-sufficient?

  3. What is your business model and how do you maintain operations without the Grant System?

  4. With Uniswap coming to Moonbeam, how does this this affect you?

  5. What is the average swap size/value on StellaSwap?

  6. Can you provide more measurable numbers with TVL, UAW, Transactions, Token holders growth, which is supported by public Web3Go Analytics Dashboard?

StellaSwap is a first in many categories especially grants to date, the question is what can be done without them?

I don’t believe taking advantage of Moonbeam Grants should be a projects sustainability model.

Thanks

Hey Thiago thanks for your feedback! I’ll try my best to address each point;

  1. Please describe in details the rewards distribution to each pool. Although it might suffer some slight changes in the future, it’s important to understand which pools will be receiving incentives and how much its expected each to receive

This will be addressed in the updated proposal with the relevant details.

  1. “the drop in TVL for our V2 was completely expected due to […] and significant reduction on our grant amount in USD in the last cycle”. Regarding this point, it seems that Stella’s TVL is highly dependent on external incentives. With a lot of new features coming to Stella, will the project reach self-sustainable levels in a way that it won’t require grants to grow?

Firstly, reduction in TVL was expected because we transited to Pulsar V3, as was established in the purpose of the previous grants. RIght now, almost all the TVL is on our V3 and stable AMM, which is the goal. Secondly, yes, TVL will always be reliant on incentives, whether ecosystem or native (STELLA). However, the reliance has dropped significantly, which was what we’ve explicated. A good barometer of this would be slippage analysis; with much lower TVL in the previous cycle, we’ve managed to reduced slippage significantly due to extreme efficiencies of our V3. So even with a high of $28M TVL in our previous grant cycle, our current high of $12M TVL has much lower slippage and lower trading costs for users. In fact, our last grants was testament to the weaning effect of grants overall. Here’s some context;

Previous Grant (Mar 2023): 1,677,150 GLMR
Value at time of receival: $637,317
value today: $452,662
Max TVL Achieved: $12M
Grant to TVL Ratio = 56X

Former Grant (Oct 2022): 7,833,600 GLMR
Value at time of receival: $3,086,928
Value today: $2,114,287
Max TVL Achieved: $28M
Grant to TVL Ratio = 54X

From the above, its clear that our previous grants was only 25% of the value that we got prior, which explains the linear relationship between TVL & incentives. BUT we performed 2X better with our previous grants as we’ve fostered stickiness and achieved efficiency.

Thirdly, sustainability is our goal and if grants stopped tomorrow we’ll be operational. In fact most of our pools are already self-sustaining with trade fee APR. But a greater question would be what happens to the ecosystem if liquidity dried up, because we’re all aware of the linear relationship between incentives + liquidity in DeFi. And as currently the leading DEX on Polkadot where 60%-75% of DAILY TRADES on Polkadot happening on StellaSwap, it would be disastrous if incentives stopped and capital outflow causes thin markets that would make trading sub-optimal. Without an efficient market for price discovery, the ecosystem cannot function optimally.

  1. You mentioned the Off-Chain Rewarder for AML’s in the “FAIR & EQUITABLE APPROACH FOR ACTIVE LIQUIDITY MANAGERS (ALMs).”. I read the whole section and it’s really exciting to see teams in our ecosystem working on real problems with no good solutions – I’m really excited to see the outcome of this. However, off-chain architecture brings some challenges and potential points of failure, etc. Could you expand on the security aspect of this solution? What measurements were taken to mitigate any risks? Also, are the ALMs aligned with the feature and will they trust and use it? Please share the feedbacks you’ve received from other teams.

On security, the off-chain rewarder actually enhances the overall security by reducing single point of failure: farming contracts. Currently all farming contracts are the custodian of tokens. If there’s exploit then all user funds are at risk. With off-chain rewarder they can keep tokens/NFTs in their wallet and still earn rewards. In terms of operational security, the token distribution smart contracts will be Audited. Distribution smart contracts hold reward tokens in our case STELLA + GLMR. The off-chain reward calculation script will open-source and public so anyone can see the calculation method and run for themselves.

We’ve also put in design a dispute mechanism, where after we push Merkle Root hash to Distributor there’s a dispute window (30mins - 1 hour) before root gets into effect.
During this window anyone can dispute if they find anamoly. To avoid DOS attacks, we require users to lock collateral before disputing ( STELLA tokens ). Then our team validates the dispute, if it’s valid then we refund collateral and remove the tree and potentially give some reward for their service. If it’s not valid then the protocol keeps the collateral and root get’s into effect.

This solution came out after talking to multiple ALMs that we’ve talked withand this is what seems the most effective method of rewarding ALMs on Moonbeam. We’ve actually discussed this solutions with all the ALMs that’s interested to deploy on Moonbeam and the offchain rewarder was agreed in unison to be the most optimal way. And hence, we embarked on it.

  1. What will be the safety mechanisms and backup plan in case of a black swan event (technically and macroeconomically). What will be the plans for the grants distribution when that happens?

As GLMR (incentive) represents a finite resource that must be effectively deployed, StellaSwap must be ready to deploy a contingency plan in the event of a black swan. The main concerns around pausing or stopping emissions due to adverse market conditions is as follows;

  1. If LP’s know there’s a possibility of disruption in rewards they won’t bring it to being with and the campaign won’t be successful
  2. We have seen that it is more expensive to attract liquidity back thus offsetting any “savings” in pausing

With that in mind, we believe that any stoppage to the emissions should only occur in a scenario similar of that to what we experienced;

  • In the event of a security incident that resulted in the de-pegging of an asset, StellaSwap will cease emissions into the farm until there is clarity on next steps, whether it be post-resolution or deprecation
  1. Please only consider metrics that are directly related to the grant goals. Lower slippage , for example, seems to be a feature and not a goal. It’s a great feature, but this grant is not being used for lowering slippage or the reducing the cost of trading — these features were achieved by product development by your team in earlier stages and will help to achieve the actual goals (maybe TVL, UAW, transactions, etc).

Firstly, I’d argue that slippage is the core reason as to why TVL matters; DEXs require TVL to create efficient markets. Looking solely at TVL as the end result doesn’t paint the right picture. For instance, I’ve laid down that our previous grants, which we had only 25% of the value compared to the grants back in 2022, had resulted in much lower slippage. This means that if you’re trading $10k GLMR on StellaSwap today, your cost of trading is so much lower as compared to when our TVL was at $28M. Cost of trading is perhaps the main objective of why we’re getting grants in the first place. That’s why trade efficiency plays a vital role in ensuring that every $1 of TVL results in lower slippage compared to the past.

So to summarize, looking at TVL alone doesn’t make sense. We can have 10X the TVL on other DEXs with V2, but users will still go to StellaSwap because the cost of trading is lower. Our metrics on user count addresses UAW and we will include txn count in the revised proposal, but we don’t think the latter is important as txn count could encompass a wider range of irrelevant stuff. For instance, a DEX could have 10X more txn count than StellaSwap, but the bulk of the txn count is due to their oracle operations and not trade txns.

  1. Please provide milestones and KPI breakdown for the 6-month incentives. What do you expect in terms of User Growth, Tx Growth and TVL Growth. Although market conditions might interfere significantly in this plan, it is the outmost importance that Stella provides the community with tangible, quantifiable metrics of success.

We would revert with the relevant KPI’s in the revised proposal.

  1. According to Web3Go analytics, I compared the performance of the grantees of the Tranche 1 Program. It seems Beamswap is achieving similar results or growth with 1/3 of the grant Stellaswap’s team has received. Please comment on the case, provide your thoughts on the efficiency of the previous grant, and your strategy and tactics for efficiently use of the grant to bring more growth to Stellaswap and Moonbeam.

It would be great to highlight exactly the metric that you’re referring to. If its txn count, then the explanation of it not being reflective of ‘growth’ or trade-related functions which is the focus of our grants objective (most of their txn count is due to oracles fetching prices at a fixed cadence). We’ve highlighted several metrics that include TVL, slippage and volume, all of which are representative of a DEX business. So if you compare that, then you’ll easily uncover the extend of our effectiveness.

  • 85% - 95% of TOTAL VOLUME on Moonbeam is on StellaSwap, even with Beamswap deploying their grants, it didn’t make a dent to the overall daily volumes
  • Let’s go even further, 60%-75% of volume on POLKADOT is on StellaSwap
  • Over $8M in TVL vs $800k in beamswap

Hey there thanks for your question!

I would really like to know at what point Stellaswap will consider that it does not need more incentives (grants) to be able to be functional and sustainable. Stellaswap has received various grants since the beginning. so the tvl is currently only incentive farmers?

Sustainability is our goal and if grants stopped tomorrow we’ll be operational. In fact most of our pools are already self-sustaining with trade fee APR. But a greater question would be what happens to the ecosystem if liquidity dried up, because we’re all aware of the linear relationship between incentives + liquidity in DeFi. And as currently the leading DEX on Polkadot where 60%-75% of DAILY TRADES on Polkadot happening on StellaSwap, it would be disastrous if incentives stopped and capital outflow causes thin markets that would make trading sub-optimal. Without an efficient market for price discovery, the ecosystem cannot function optimally.

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