It appears that influencer’s communities tend to support them by default, but this does not guarantee that influencers have a thorough understanding of governance, voting, grants, treasury, or the genuine needs of the network, users, and devs. In many cases, influencers possess superficial knowledge. additionally, their opinions, along with the opinions of their communities, can be strongly influenced by bear markets, potentially hindering the development and support of important initiatives. they may mistakenly assume that grants / treasury funds allocation becomes unnecessary during bear market for the common good and project development, leading them to engage in actions that provoke harm to the network.
regarding collators, these individuals / entities have already demonstrated, through their actions rather than mere words, that they are active network participants who possess knowledge about technical features and understand the reasons behind necessary updates. therefore, their opinion is considered objective. collators often actively participate in discussions on forum and are an integral part of the community. they are highly valued in all chains, with each collator valuing their reputation and being vigilant about network activities. hence, I do not anticipate any provocations from them.
as mentioned earlier, my main idea is not unfounded but rather draws inspiration from one of the most successful voting practices in the Cosmos ecosystem. there, validators possess the right to vote on behalf of their delegators, while delegators retain the ability to cancel their validator’s vote. this approach empowers delegators to exercise their voting discretion.
the Cosmos community exhibits significant engagement in voting. therefore, I would not dismiss it as useless, but rather emphasize the importance of thoroughly examining how it is effectively structured in other ecosystems. taking inspiration from these examples would be more advantageous, given that expectations often do not align with practical outcomes. encouraging user participation in governance is indeed a challenging endeavor.
regarding token locking, there are opportunities for discussion and potential configurations since we have the ability to customize the code according to community preferences. In this context, I don’t see much difference when users independently delegate their voting rights to delegates. many users often forget about their actions, and they may not even be aware of the duration of the token lock. however, if this were by default , it would certainly require discussion on the forum and proper notification to the community. In general, I believe it could be similar to auto-compounding, where the delegator can determine the % of their tokens that can be used for voting. nonetheless, I think that many individuals would not willingly cast their votes if it meant a locking period. therefore, these aspects need to be discussed within the community. It seems appropriate to adopt an approach similar to a snapshot, where only the tokens present in a specific block at the time of the snapshot are considered, without affecting the lock of delegator tokens. otherwise, I believe the number of delegations would be low, which would not justify the efforts invested
